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"THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST IS OUR DOCTRINE": 
HISTORY OR HISTRIONICS? 
BY ROBERT C. BANNISTER 
Whatever their differences American reformers of the late nine- 
teenth century reached unusual agreement on one point. Opponents 
of increased state action, they alleged, were engaged in a highly 
dubious enterprise of wedding Darwinism to the virtues of classical 
economics, thus trading illicitly on the prestige of the new science. 
In Progress and Poverty (1879), Henry George charged that Mal- 
thusianism was now "buttressed" by the new science, and bemoaned 
"a sort of hopeful fatalism, of which current literature is full." "The 
final plea for any form of brutality in these days," wrote the National- 
ist Edward Bellamy, "is that it tends to the survival of the fittest." 
"The survival of the fittest is our doctrine," echoed the reformer 
Henry Demarest Lloyd. "The representatives of science" noted the 
sociologist Lester Ward more soberly, "stand boldly in the track of 
current events." Ward acknowledged that appeals to "natural law" 
antedated the Darwinian doctrines of "survival of the fittest" and 
"natural selection." But, he added, "it cannot be denied that these 
doctrines ... have greatly strengthened this habit of thought."' 
This testimony is important for two reasons. Urging programs that 
ranged from the Single Tax to socialism, these reformers were in com- 
mon battle against theories of laissez-faire, individualism, and related 
success mythologies that had bloomed during America's first stage of 
industrialism. The charge that defenders of laissez-faire had misap- 
propriated Darwinism was an important part of their struggle since 
it usually prefaced a "correct" reading of evolution, the "reform Dar- 
winism" that informed many socialist and neo-liberal proposals. More- 
over, these same charges were widely quoted in historical accounts of 
"social Darwinism" which appeared during the 1940's and 1950's, the 
most important of which is Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in 
American Thought (1944). Darwinism-as embodied in the popular 
catchwords "struggle for existence," "natural selection," and "survival 
of the fittest," as well as in a general evolutionism-was, Hofstadter 
'Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York, 1942), 101, 480. Edward Bel- 
lamy, Edward Bellamy Speaks Again! (1937), 34. Lloyd, Man the Social Creator (New 
York, 1906), 218-20. Lester F. Ward "Politico-Social Functions" [1881], Glimpses of 
the Cosmos (6 vols., New York, 1913-18), II, 336; "Mind as a Social Factor" [1884], 
ibid., III, 364. I wish to thank the American Council of Learned Societies for a Fellow- 
ship under which this study was begun. 
377 
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378 ROBERT C. BANNISTER 
writes, "one of the great informing insights in . . . the history of the 
conservative mind in America." The Darwinized conservatism against 
which George and other reformers battled was real. Their attack upon 
it was part of a struggle "to wrest Darwinism from the social Dar- 
winists." From Hofstadter's study-and those of Curti, Goldman, 
Fine and others-a post-New Deal generation learned that the "sur- 
vival of the fittest," as Lloyd said, had indeed once been "our [Amer- 
ica's] doctrine."2 
Yet how reliable are such contemporary statements? What con- 
servatives specifically were under indictment? These questions involve 
not only the accuracy of eye-witness testimony, but bear upon a contin- 
uing controversy concerning the nature and extent of conservative 
social Darwinism in the period before 1900. Two sorts of considera- 
tions have already tempered the Hofstadter view. In his studies of 
business thought Irving Wyllie finds little evidence that businessmen 
invoked the Darwinian catchwords in their own defense. And on the 
scientific side Loren Eiseley has demonstrated that Darwin himself 
retreated from his catchwords by de-emphasizing struggle and stressing 
the Lamarckian principle of inheritance.3 Moreover, my own reading 
of allegedly conservative Darwinian texts suggests that Wyllie's con- 
clusions may be extended to professionals and other intellectuals as 
well, in the sense that the Darwinian phrases functioned in the debates 
of the Gilded Age quite differently than pictured in the traditional ac- 
counts.4 What then of the contemporary testimony? Wyllie specifically 
urges caution in evaluating these statements. But the allegations of 
Ward and others, although often quoted, have not been so scrutinized. 
A detailed study of the development of the charge from the 1870's on, 
2Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston, 1955), 5-6. 
"Conservative Darwinism" is also described in Carleton B. Hayes, Generation of Ma- 
terialism (New York, 1941), 9-13, 46, 113-14, 229; J. Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wagner 
(London, 1942), 42, 67-9, 100-10; T. Cochran and W. Miller, Age of Enterprise (New 
York, 1942), 119-50; M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (2nd ed., New York, 
1943), 569-77, 640-41, 670-71; Stow Persons (ed.), Evolutionary Thought in America 
(New Haven, 1950); H. S. Commager, American Mind (New Haven, 1950), 199-226; 
E. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, 1952), 85-104; S. Fine, Laissez 
Faire and the General Welfare State (Ann Arbor, 1956); and in modified form in S. 
Persons, American Minds (New York, 1958). 
3I. Wyllie, The Self Made Man (Rutgers, 1954), esp. 86; "Social Darwinism and the 
Businessman," Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. CIII (1959), 629-35. Loren Eiseley, Darwin's 
Century (New York, 1958). Tempering is evident in several recent texts, including R. J. 
Wilson, ed. Darwinism and the American Intellectual (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), 
93-106; G. Daniels, ed. Darwinism Comes to America (Waltham, Mass., 1968); and 
John A. Garraty, The American Nation (New York, 1966), 475-76. 
4I am currently preparing a reassessment of the "social Darwinism" of such 
American conservatives as William Graham Sumner, as part of a general study of Dar- 
winism and American social thought from 1860 to 1920. 
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"SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST" 379 
it will be argued here, places the debates of conservatives and their op- 
ponents in new perspective, and suggests that later historical accounts 
were in an important sense a final chapter in the same exchange. 
Although the Origin of Species gained considerable acceptance in 
the decade following its publication, many Americans in the 1870's 
continued to find reason to suspect Darwinism. An odium theologium 
lingered, often buttressed by a philosophical idealism that distrusted 
the "materialism" and "fatalism" associated with the evolutionary 
hypothesis. The fact that Darwin had been inspired in part by the 
writings of Robert Malthus made him even more suspect to the many 
who opposed Malthusianism. What might happen when religion, phi- 
losophy, and politics fused, became apparent in the writings of three 
opponents of classical economics in the 1870's: Henry Carey, Amer- 
ica's leading Protectionist; John L. Peck, an anti-Spencerian who in 
1879 built on the work of Carey in a discussion of The Political Econ- 
omy of Democracy; and Francis Bowen, Professor of Philosophy at 
Harvard, who in the same year warned readers of the North American 
Review of the dangers of "Malthusianism, Darwinism and Pessimism." 
Son of Mathew Carey, who helped shape Clay's American Sys- 
tem, Henry C. Carey fused Adam Smith's faith in natural law with 
the elder Carey's devotion to the American dream of economic oppor- 
tunity for all. Like his father, Henry rejected the ideas of Malthus and 
Ricardo but he amended Smith's theories to adopt Protectionism in 
the 1840's. Nature, Carey urged in opposition to Malthus, worked to- 
ward a universal harmony of interests, the theme of his many books of 
the pre-Civil War period. The perfect social science would provide 
men "the highest individualism and the greatest power of association 
with his fellow men," an "association" which the twentieth century 
would term national planning.5 In the Unity of Law (1872), his final 
work, Carey restated this creed for the post-war generation. Rooting 
social science more firmly than ever in natural philosophy, he drew 
heavily on E. L. Youmans' Correlation and Conservation of Forces 
(1865), which translated the latest findings of physics into a celebra- 
tion of the ultimate unity of matter and spirit. So sustained, Carey in- 
sisted again that the laws of society and of nature were one, thus 
further guaranteeing absolute certainty to principles he secretly feared 
had not brought perfection or unity to society.6 
In the original text of the Unity of Law, Carey ignored Darwin- 
ism, perhaps because he suspected the Origin threatened his pur- 
5A. D. H. Kaplan, Henry Charles Carey (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Histori- 
cal and Political Science, XLIX. no. 4, 1931), 82. Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course oj 
American Democratic Thought (New York, 1940), 80-86. 
6Kaplan, Carey, 61. 
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pose, or perhaps because Darwin's views concerning human society 
were being published in The Descent of Man just as Carey prepared 
his work for press. With the appearance of the Descent, however, 
Carey answered Darwin in hastily added footnotes and textual inser- 
tions. The result was an early instance of the spectre of conservative 
Darwinism. Carey conceded that most men faced a life of poverty, 
pestilence, and war. For this state of affairs the followers of Adam 
Smith offered no cure: material wealth and its transfer were their 
sole concern, not the mental and moral aspect of economic life. "Need 
we now wonder," Carey asked, "that a system so thoroughly material- 
istic should have given rise to a school from which we learn, that 'sur- 
vival of the fittest,' and crushing out of the less 'fitted,' constitute 
the basis of all natural arrangements for promoting advance in 
civilization?"7 
Had Darwin himself actually taught such a lesson? A careful read- 
ing of The Unity of Law suggests that Carey compounded several 
quite different elements in his charge. He specifically criticized a pas- 
sage in the Descent in which Darwin wondered briefly what effect 
vaccination and similar measures would have upon the future well- 
being of the human race. Darwin-in passages that Carey ignored- 
made it clear that his concern was fleeting: men had no choice but to 
go ahead with such measures. Carey ignored this conclusion because, 
more than vaccination, his concern was the general neglect of social 
problems that had "from the days of Malthus" been "the tendency of 
the teachings of the British school." Religion and economics merged. 
How could one continue to believe in a God, Carey asked, "whose 
laws, as now generally exhibited, tend toward reducing the millions 
to a condition of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water for those 
few who are encouraged to eat, drink, and make merry, while provid- 
ing measures for securing at the earliest moment, the 'elimination' of 
those who, being poor and uninstructed, are incapable of self-protec- 
tion." Darwinism and Malthusianism shared a common spirit. Each 
was "materialistic," a symptom of the worst tendencies of the new 
age. Together they provided "for the use of science a politico-eco- 
nomic man, a monster, on the one hand influenced solely by the thirst 
for wealth, and on the other so entirely under the control of sexual 
passion as to be at all times ready to indulge it." That such a philoso- 
phy appeared further to justify international warfare, Carey added, 
made it only the more reprehensible. Thus were routed atheistic Dar- 
winism, callous laissez-faire, and for good measure, the militarist 
spirit.8 
?Henry Carey, The Unity of Law (Philadelphia, 1872), xvii, 157, 183, 295. 
8Ibid., xviii-xix, 59, 370-72. Cf. C. Darwin, Descent of Man (2 vols., New York, 
1872), I, 161-63. 
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Like Carey, the economist-philosopher John Lord Peck joined 
concern for man's soul with interest in his social condition. In his first 
book, The Ultimate Generalization (1876), philosophical and spiritual 
concerns sparked a vigorous attack on Spencer's Synthetic Philos- 
ophy. Peck for the moment avoided the social implications of evolu- 
tion, but in The Political Economy of Democracy (1879), he spoke 
directly to social issues. Peck's specific program included a grad- 
uated tax, compulsory education, the appropriation of railroad land 
for settlers, a steady money supply (neither hard nor soft), and moder- 
ate protection in the interests of labor. But more generally he focused 
on a comparison of the classical English school and the views of Carey, 
whom he (somewhat inaccurately) made a supporter of his proposals. 
After describing the views of both schools, and in particular Carey's 
attacks on Malthusianism, Peck then echoed a charge of conservative 
Darwinism much like that which appeared in Unity of Law. "It is 
assumed that the best man will win in the struggle for existence (that 
is, wealth)," he wrote, summarizing the "English School," "and thus 
the survival of the fittest, in agreement with the law of Natural Selec- 
tion will be secured." Peck even more than Carey did not suppose that 
men could "escape the law of the survival of the fittest." "The Superior 
will live and thrive at the expense of the inferior, in trade and indus- 
try as truly as in the conflicts of savages, or in the chase of wild beasts 
for their prey," he conceded. "But the superiority should be superior- 
ity of intelligence and character, not one of wealth and good fortune 
merely." Government, by enacting his proposals, would guarantee 
such superiority.9 
Like Carey, Francis Bowen of Harvard absorbed Darwinism in 
the latter part of a distinguished career devoted to Christianity and 
the protective tariff. Like Peck and Carey he was also a staunch op- 
ponent of Malthusianism. But Bowen was also a philosopher whose 
devotion to Idealism gave his crusade an added dimension. In the 
early 1860's, he joined battle with both Positivism and evolutionism, 
whether manifested in the Origin of Species or in Henry Thomas 
Buckle's "gospel of fatalism and unbelief." In the mid-1870's he added 
other philosophers to his list, in particular the Germans Schopenhauer 
and von Hartmann whose work he criticized in Modern Philosophy 
(1877).10 
Bowen's attack on "Malthusianism, Darwinism, and Pessimism" 
(1879) wed these several concerns into a plea for patrician fertility, 
family life, and colonial (or western) settlement. Taking his foes in 
9John L. Peck, The Ultimate Generalization (New York, 1876); The Political Econ- 
omy of Democracy (Philadelphia, 1879), 3-29. 
'?F. Bowen, Gleanings of a Literary Life, 1838-80 (New York, 1880), passim; 
Modern Philosophy (New York, 1877). 
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382 ROBERT C. BANNISTER 
turn, Bowen first attacked Malthus and his followers for callousness 
in the face of human misery, an attitude which in Bowen's view was 
the more unjustified since decline in population during the century had 
entirely disproved Malthus' theory. The Harvard professor was es- 
pecially appalled that people of "wealth," "culture," and "refinement" 
had apparently taken Malthus to heart in limiting their own numbers. 
He then noted that Darwinism as an extension of Malthus' theory was 
refuted by these same demographic facts: in the "struggle for exis- 
tence" among men the lower orders, not the upper classes, survive; 
"And this victory is a survival not of the fittest, but of the unfittest. 
. ." Anyway, he added, Darwinism had triumphed not because it was 
proved, but because it served the cause of irreligion. The "sole in- 
novation" of Darwinism upon general evolutionism was a mechanical 
materialism, and it was this that provided "the pepper which made the 
dish palatable to . . . those English and German naturalists who had 
a previous bias in favor of materialism .... " Finally, came pessimism, 
which in German philosophy was but an extension of this same spirit, 
depriving men of all hope of future happiness, and hence of the will 
either to reform the world or to multiply and "fill the vacant places 
on the earth's surface." Unless the spell were broken, Bowen con- 
cluded, sounding a familiar variation on New England's fears of de- 
cline, America would go the way of the Roman Empire.1 
Although Bowen implied as much, he was less direct than Carey 
and Peck in charging that Darwinists literally called for a "survival of 
the fittest" in society.12 Instead he merely assumed that Darwinists 
so argued in order to demonstrate that demography refuted their en- 
tire position. Like Carey and Peck he reasoned that Malthusianism 
(which he disliked) issued in Darwinism (which he also disliked). The 
two might thus be interchanged and attacked accordingly. Neither 
Carey, Peck, nor Bowen identified specific contemporaries who but- 
tressed laissez-faire with Darwinism, an omission the more sur- 
prising in Peck's case given his animus toward Spencer.13 In fact 
Carey's cautious mention of the "tendency" of British thought, Peck's 
obvious paraphrase, and Bowen's circumlocutions make one wonder 
if any meant literally to identify conservative Darwinists, or if rather 
they had forged their various fears and uncertainties into a highly in- 
accurate description of modern thought. 
Henry George opposed Protectionism and singled out Carey for 
special attack. But his indictment of "buttressed" Malthusianism in 
"F. Bowen, "Malthusianism, Darwinism, and Pessimism," North American Re- 
view CXXIX (1879), 450-51, 456, 470-72. 
'2Cf. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 88. 
'3In The Kingdom of the Selfish (New York, 1889), 221, 242 ff. Peck singled out 
Sumner and Spencer. His guide was Lester Ward discussed below. 
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"SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST" 383 
Progress and Poverty, directly echoed that of the Protectionists.14 
Malthusian doctrines had always obstructed reform, George wrote, 
and "of late years" the theory had "received new support in the rapid 
change of ideas as to the origin of man and the genesis of species." 
Poverty, a noted economist had written, provided a powerful stimulus 
to industry and progress. "What is this," George demanded, "but the 
recognition in regard to human society of the developing effects of the 
'struggle for existence' and 'survival of the fittest.'" The evolution 
philosophy bred "materialism" and "fatalism." A philosophy that 
denied God allied itself naturally with an economics that believed 
"that nature wastes men by constantly bringing them into being where 
there is no room for them."15 
Sustaining these charges was George's instinctive devotion to 
Christianity and faith in a universe in which natural and moral law 
were ultimately one-"eighteenth century superstitions," as Bernard 
Shaw described them when he heard George speak in London. George 
was not ignorant of the latest thought: Progress and Poverty bristled 
with the names of Buckle, Bagehot, Maine, and Spencer. But George's 
sympathies and assumptions were those of the Enlightenment-of 
Benjamin Franklin or Joseph Priestly, through whose eyes he invited 
readers to survey nineteenth-century progress. The best efforts of 
social science and economics could not improve the "moral law": 
this was the message of Progress and Poverty. Purged of impurities, 
Bagehot, Maine, and others demonstrated that "association in equality 
is the law of progress," which in turn was naught "but the moral law." 
"The economic law and the moral law" were also "essentially one." 
"The truth which the intellect grasps after toilsome effort is but that 
which the moral sense reaches by a quick intuition."16 
Darwinism upset such happy assumptions. Throughout his career 
George harbored suspicion of the theory, a suspicion that colored his 
thought no less than Carey's and Bowen's. In Progress and Poverty he 
attempted to evade the issue. How men had originated was not his 
concern: "all we know of him is as man." But his hostility was plain. 
During the 1880's he mellowed somewhat, comforted by the views of 
the British biologist A. R. Wallace (who early preached the "limits 
of evolution as applied to man," and who also befriended George dur- 
ing his English crusade) and of St. George Mivart, a leading Christian 
evolutionist who, more firmly than Wallace, denied that natural selec- 
tion has shaped human faculties. By the 1890's George could manage 
grudging acceptance. "In a sense" all men believed in evolution, and 
14George mentioned Carey in Progress and Poverty, 35, 227-28, in Protection or 
Free Trade (New York, 1941), 9, 79, and in The Science of Political Economy (New 
York, 1941), 93-4, 196. '5George, Progress and Poverty, 99-102, 480-81, 558. 
"6Charles A. Barker, Henry George (New York, 1955), 376; George, Progress and 
Poverty, 508, 526, 560. 
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indeed always had, he wrote. But, he confessed, he remained "unable to 
see the weight of the evidence of man's descent from other animals."17 
The absence of Darwinian rhetoric in George's writings mirrored 
these doubts. At a time when reformers increasingly turned to Dar- 
winism for their arguments ("reform Darwinism"), George chose his 
analogies from physics, astronomy, or pre-Darwinian anatomy. "Evo- 
lution," insofar as it figures in his work, boiled down to Spencer's 
formula that progress was a movement from an "indefinite, inco- 
herent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity." The laws 
of society were as unchangeable as the "laws of gravitation." The "evo- 
lution of society" and the "development of the species" revealed a 
"close analogy" only in the sense that the "bodies," physiological and 
political, resembled one another.'8 Whom then did George-uneasy 
in the face of Darwinism-consider the "buttressed" Malthusians and 
evolutionary fatalists? The answer is interesting because George did 
name names, at least four of which have figured in later accounts of 
conservative Darwinism.'9 
The first Darwinist was the British author, Winwood Reade, whom 
George cited as an evolutionary fatalist, and who later appeared in at 
least two accounts of social Darwinism.20 The work in question was 
Reade's The Martyrdom of Man (1872). The author had intended to 
make his subject "The Origin of Mind" until The Descent of Man 
seemed to leave little to add. Reade instead contented himself with il- 
lustrating Darwin with the aid of his own observations of "savage" life 
in Africa. Reade's central point, in keeping with the conventional 
wisdom of mid-Victorian England, was that civilized man transcended 
the struggles that marred his emergence from barbarism. Reade's 
contrasts of savagery and civilization forecast Darwinian blueprints 
of colonialism that would emerge in later decades, while his descrip- 
tions of the origin of mind and of man's ability to control nature was 
of the sort that later inspired many reform Darwinist formulations. 
Reade was also a Comtist and it was his final aim to picture the Tri- 
'George, Progress and Poverty, 476; Barker, George, 339, 359-60; George, A 
Perplexed Philosopher(London, 1937), 105-6. 
'8George, Progress and Poverty, 514, also Free Trade, 160; Social Problems 
(New York, 1949), 1. 
'9The four are Winwood Reade, William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, anu 
Edward L. Youmans. Although George probably made only a minor contribution to 
Sumner's and Spencer's reputations as "conservative Darwinists," his criticisms of 
Reade and Youmans appear to have influenced directly later accounts. For Reade, see 
Barzun, Darwin, 108 and Goldman, Rendezvous, 91-2. For Youmans see Hofstadter, 
Social Darwinism, 34; Commager, American Mind, 202; Goldman, Rendezvous, 
85; and Fine, Laissez Faire, 136 n. George, Progress and Poverty, 100-01 also identified 
a fifth individual-first quoting a statement by the vehemently anti-Darwinian Louis 
Agassiz that Darwinism was "Malthus all over," and then rendering a Darwinian 
paraphrase of the pre-Darwinian economist E. R. McCulloch. 
20Barzun, Darwin, 108; Goldman, Rendezvous, 91-2. 
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umph of Positivism over orthodox religion, which he did in his closing 
chapters.21 
George chose the example of Reade because "in a semi-scientific 
or popularized form this modern fatalism may perhaps be seen . . . 
best." To illustrate his point, he provided a brief quotation in which 
Reade observed that "our own progress is founded on the agonies of 
the past." Reade wondered: "Is it therefore unjust that we also should 
suffer for the benefit of those who are to come." George here saw the 
spectre of Malthusianism. "In this view progress is the result of forces 
which work slowly, steadily, and remorselessly, for the elevation of 
man," he noted. "War, slavery, tyranny, superstition, famine and 
pestilence are the impelling causes which drive men on, by eliminating 
poorer types and extending the higher." He concluded by attacking 
Reade's "materialism."22 
Regrettably, in his haste to illustrate his argument, George over- 
looked the remainder of the same passage in The Martyrdom of Man, 
an oversight perpetuated in later histories. Reade indeed believed that 
past suffering had yielded civilization. But he was equally certain that 
such physical suffering had no present or future role. The complete 
passage reads: 
Famine, pestilence, and war are no longer essential for the advancement of 
the human race. But a season of mental anguish is at hand, and through this 
we must pass in order that our posterity may rise. The soul must be sacri- 
ficed; the hope in immortality must die. A sweet and charming illusion must 
be taken from the human race, as youth and beauty vanish never to return.23 
The argument, that is, concerned Positivism. The new agonies would 
be spiritual, the "disturbance and distress," as Reade termed it, that 
resulted from moving from the religious through the metaphysical to 
the positivist stage. Irreverent Reade was, and perhaps condescending 
toward "inferior" peoples, and for these reasons he stirred George's 
sensibilities. But he was not, as George suggested, urging poverty and 
social inaction in the name of Darwin and progress. 
During the 1880's George added a second name to support his con- 
viction that "science" somehow furthered inaction. William Graham 
Sumner of Yale, the "reverend professor" of Political Economy as 
George called him, offended the Californian's deepest convictions no 
less than did Reade, and was a considerably greater threat to the 
Single Tax program.24 Progress, said Sumner, was the result of man's 
21W. Reade, The Martyrdom of Man (22nd ed., London, n.d.), passim. 
22Progress and Poverty, 480-81. 
23Reade, Martyrdom, 543-44. See Barzun, 108; Goldman, 91-2. 
24For the Sumner-George exchange see Sumner's review of Progress and Poverty 
(New York Times, June 6, 1880); What Social Classes Owe Each Other (New York, 
1911), esp. 22, 48-52, 68; George, Social Problems, 63, 67, 72. George also attacked 
Sumner in Free Trade, 250-52. 
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victory in a "struggle for existence" against nature-capital being 
both the instrument and effect of such triumph. Among men there ob- 
tained a "competition of life," the rules of which were relative to the 
character of the struggle with nature, and which thus altered only grad- 
ually. A confirmed Malthusian, Sumner argued for strict laissez- 
faire, and even on two or three occasions (of which George was appar- 
ently unaware) did indeed attempt to buttress his position by saying 
that the alternative to the "survival of the fittest" was the "survival 
of the unfittest," a tactic that drew criticism upon him and which he 
avoided in What Social Classes Owe Each Other. However "conserva- 
tive" he may have been, Sumner was firm on two points: the "struggle 
for existence" was not necessarily fierce (in fact was relatively easy 
in the modern period), and was not a battle among men as Darwinian- 
oriented critics often interpreted it; and free access to nature would 
benefit everyone (not just an elite), in particular the Forgotten Men 
of the Middle Classes.25 
In attacking the "reverend professor," George blurred precisely 
these points, the result being a number of subtle distortions of Sum- 
ner's position. Engaged in polemics, George naturally had little con- 
cern for the finer points of Sumner's position. But more important than 
the distortions (that need not be detailed here) was the fact that 
George's hostility to Darwinism clearly figured in his attack. His 
charge that Sumner accepted a "fierce struggle for existence" and 
slow "race evolution" required little in the way of further argument, 
because to George the phrases instinctively suggested an undesirable 
state of affairs. 
In A Perplexed Philosopher (1892), George added Herbert Spen- 
cer and his leading American disciple, Edward L. Youmans, to his list 
of conservative evolutionists. At that time he insisted that he had at- 
tacked Spencerianism all along. Actually, Progress and Poverty 
owed a great deal to Spencer. Judging Social Statics "a noble book, and 
in the deepest sense a religious minded book," George found in it not 
only refutation of the "expediency" he opposed, but the germ of 
his entire theory that private property in land violated the law of 
equity and was at the root of the social problem. Like Spencer, George 
desired minimal government. Despite its call for abolition of private 
property in land, sections of Progress and Poverty read like Spencer 
on "over-legislation." More generally, he shared with the Englishman 
25Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 56-57, speculates that Sumner distinguished the 
"struggle for existence" from the "competition of life" "perhaps ... to dull the resent- 
ment of the poor toward the rich." However, Hofstadter continues, Sumner "did not 
at all times . . . shrink from a direct analogy between animal struggle and human com- 
petition." Hofstadter offers no evidence of such direct analogies, and I have been un- 
able to find any in Sumner's writings. Rather Sumner's rigid insistence on the distinc- 
tion was part of an overall effort to salvage classical economics while avoiding the crude 
"social Darwinism" with which he is charged. 
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a desire to ground matter and spirit, expediency and morality, in an 
overarching cosmic law. If in 1879 George had doubts concerning the 
direction of Spencer's thought, he muted them, and invoked both 
the name and rhetoric of the philosopher in support of his cause.26 
A Perplexed Philosopher, in contrast, was the work of a jilted 
suitor, and read like breach of promise proceedings. George had 
learned as early as 1882 that Spencer would not endorse the Single 
Tax, a loss that was a distinct blow to his pride and his crusade. 
Spencer was "horribly conceited" he confided to a friend following 
their first meeting. Spencer has not merely changed his mind, George 
added later: he was "going the way of Comte . . . going insane from 
vanity." When Spencer formally revised Social Statics in 1892 and re- 
moved the sections concerning land tenure, George published all his 
bitterness. Spencer had been "dishonest ... in a way that makes flat 
falsehood seem manly." He had "betrayed" the cause. His motives 
had been sordid throughout.27 
In this spirit George turned to consider the evolutionary philos- 
ophy. Forgetting Winwood Reade, he moved Spencer to center stage. 
The foe remained "materialism," but George levelled the charge di- 
rectly against the Unknowable, which was not God whatever Spencer's 
defenders claimed. Social Statics (which he continued to praise) had 
been "a protest against materialism," a call to reformers to regard, 
not simple expediency, but "a divinely appointed order to which, if it 
would prosper, society must conform." The Synthetic Philosophy, 
however, was "materialistic" and "fatalistic."28 
Yet did "fatalism" necessarily mean conservatism? Turning to 
this question, George surveyed some of the same philosophical issues 
with which Bowen had earlier wrestled. Fatalism, George noted, was 
very much like its opposite-the emphasis on total will and the "re- 
nunciation of the will to live," such as Schopenhauer preached. This 
doctrine; in turn, was the European equivalent of a philosophy which 
in India, as everyone knew, led to a "hopelessness of reform." "It 
seems to me that the essential fatalism of the evolutionary philosophy 
would have a similar result," George speculated. He then plunged to 
his conclusion: "as the pessimistic philosophy of the one [Schopen- 
hauer and/or Indians] seems to flow from the abandonment of action 
for mere speculation . . . so the evolutionary philosophy of the other 
seems to be such as might result from the abandonment of a noble 
purpose ... to embrace the pleasant ways of acquiescence in things as 
they are." "It is not for me to say what is cause and what is effect," he 
added.29 
26Progress and Poverty, 359-60, 364,404, 480, 487, 504. 
27Spencer, "Letter to the St. James's Gazette," Perplexed Philosopher, 52-61; 
George to E. R. Taylor, March 1882, Henry George Jr., The Life of Henry George, 
Works of Henry George (New York, 1911), X, 370; Perplexed Philosopher, 58, 67, 97. 
28Perplexed Philosopher, 101-3. 29Ibid., 118-20. 
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The proof of George's conjectures was Edward L. Youmans, his 
fourth contribution to later histories.30 Come to think of it, George 
added in a footnote, the editor of Popular Science nicely illustrated his 
point. In a conversation with George ten years previously, Youmans 
fell into speaking with much warmth of the political corruption of New York 
and of the utter carelessness and selfishness of the rich, and of their readiness 
to submit to it ... wherever it served their money getting purposes to do so. 
. .. Alluding to a conversation some time before, in which I had affirmed and 
he had denied the duty of taking part in politics, I said to him, "What do you 
propose to do about it?" 
Of a sudden his manner and tone were completely changed, as remember- 
ing his Spencerianism he threw himself back, and replied, with something 
like a sigh, "Nothing! You and I can do nothing at all. It's all a matter of 
evolution." 
George admitted the incident was incongruous. Youmans had "warm 
and generous sympathies"; his Spencerianism "seemed to me like an 
ill fitting coat he had accidentally picked up and put on." But such was 
the effect of the evolutionary philosophy.31 
George indeed had reason to debate both Spencer and Youmans. 
Spencer's devotion to laissez-faire had hardened as its support in fact 
and theory slipped away; and Youmans, in demanding careful study of 
society, often appealed to evolution (although not Darwinism) against 
reform in general and the Single Tax in particular. But the conversa- 
tion which George reported not only misrepresented Youmans, but, 
combined with his other allegations, has contributed to the distortion 
of Spencerianism in the entire period. 
The two men had chatted in the early 1880's, but each took 
away quite different impressions from their exchanges. Youmans' 
apparent resignation and lack of interest in politics irritated George. 
"He would not take the trouble to vote at election time," George 
grumbled to a friend when Youmans did not share his enthusiasm for 
Democratic party politics in 1880. Youmans "said we should have to 
slowly evolute." "And," George added, he "has told me several times 
that there was no use in trying to fight evils of which he himself is as 
conscious as anyone, as to get rid of them is a matter of thousands of 
years." 
Youmans on the other hand was equally impatient with George, as 
he explained in an attack on Progress and Poverty that drew the above 
complaints from George. Concerning George's proclamation that "as- 
sociation in equality is the law of progress," Youmans exploded, "It 
30Youmans's statement to George is cited in Goldman, Rendezvous, 85; Hofstadter 
Social Darwinism, 34; Fine, Laissez-Faire, 44; Commager, The American Mind, 202. 
31Perplexed Philosopher, 119. 
32George to E. R. Taylor, Jan. 21, 1881 in George, George, 343-44. 
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sounds like last century talk." Surely George could not so blithely 
ignore the "whole continent of facts that have been upheaved during 
the last two or three generations" concerning the early stages of man's 
development-whether by Spencer or Bagehot on the one hand, or 
Darwin in the Descent on the other? How in this age of science and 
induction could George dwell "in an ideal world," taught by "novel- 
ists, dramatists, and poets"? Youmans was no fatalist, but in conclusion 
he suggested that he was well aware that certain of his opponents 
would claim so. "Let it not be said that science thus becomes obstruc- 
tive, and paralyzes exertion," he wrote, as if anticipating the exact 
form of George's later charge; "on the contrary, it is promotive of 
real progress by checking futile effort, and disclosing the conditions 
and the way by which exertion may be made more effectual and sub- 
stantial conquests achieved."33 
Historians may well judge the merits of the Single Tax superior to 
those of Civil Service reform, hard money, or laissez-faire economics. 
But it is another matter to fashion George's subjective characteriza- 
tions of Reade and the others into an objective description of the 
laissez-faire argument: "What is this but . . . , "seems to me," 
"would have had a similar result." Was George not thus acknowledg- 
ing, as did Bowen and Carey, that he found a meaning in the words of 
his opponents that they themselves did not intend? Did Henry George 
and his fellow liberals really face a "steel chain of ideas" welded by 
Darwin and Spencer? 
The writings of two other Gilded Age reformers shed further light 
on these questions. Henry Demarest Lloyd, critic of Standard Oil, and 
Edward Bellamy, author of Looking Backward (1888), agreed with 
George that appeals to "survival of the fittest" and "natural selection" 
had strengthened the conservative defense. Reform, in turn, demanded 
a re-reading of Darwin, which they provided. 
As each made his case, a threefold pattern could be discerned. 
First, Darwinism seemed to describe accurately the nature of con- 
temporary American society. "In cannibalistic times, the best man- 
killers and maneaters survive," Lloyd noted in the mid-1880's, "in a 
selfish civilization the Vanderbilts and Rockefellers." As he put it 
in Wealth against Commonwealth (1894), "some inner circle of 
'fittest'" had sought and obtained control of America.34 Bellamy 
agreed. The Utopians in Looking Backward saw nineteenth-century 
civilization as "a struggle for existence." "The principle of competi- 
tion," intoned the Bellamyite Nationalist platform, "is simply the 
application of the brutal law of the survival of the strongest and most 
33Youmans, "Forces of Human Progress," Popular Science Monthly, XVIII 
(1881), 553-56. 
34Lloyd, Notebook IX (1888), 215, H. D. Lloyd Papers, Wisconsin Historical 
Society; Wealth Against Commonwealth (New York, 1894), 3-4. 
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cunning."35 Secondly, each alleged that an increasing number of 
Americans justified this situation by invoking Darwinian terminology. 
Seizing upon a statement in a trust hearing in which a witness con- 
fessed the "weakest must go first," Lloyd gave it a Darwinist twist and 
charged that the creed was that "practically professed" in business.36 
"Charity," wrote one Bellamyite, "preaches that some must go to the 
wall in order that others may ascend to the top round of the material 
ladder: which is complacently declared to be the law of the survival of 
the fittest."37 Finally, each insisted that, if properly understood, Dar- 
winism really supported reform. "Darwinian principles," argued 
Lloyd, "are enough to give a scientific basis to the doctrine that no 
class can be allowed . . . to hold an exclusive proprietary interest in 
anything."38 In Looking Backward, Bellamy likewise saw both gen- 
eral evolution and the more specifically Darwinian doctrine of "sexual 
selection" as chief agencies producing the new Utopia.39 
Like George, Lloyd and Bellamy provided few particulars in their 
indictments. Lloyd at one point in the 1880's jotted in his notebook an 
isolated Darwinian remark by the Englishman Henry Maine (the often 
quoted comparison of competition to a "beneficent private war"is- 
suing in "the survival of the fittest"). In 1896, he seized upon Benjamin 
Kidd's Social Evolution (1894) as yet another example of what had 
been going on for some time. But even his analysis of this volume sug- 
gests only that he read what he expected and that he missed the 
unique twist that Kidd had given the Darwinian argument. More sig- 
nificantly, in noting in Wealth against Commonwealth that "survival 
of the fittest" was the creed "practically confessed" in business, Lloyd 
tacitly acknowledged that the practice was as he himself, not the busi- 
nessmen, saw it.40 
Bellamy and his followers were equally offhand in their choice of 
conservative Darwinists, discrediting the opposition by finding Dar- 
winian meanings where they were not intended. The Hegelian Wil- 
liam Torrey Harris was a Darwinist, suggested one writer in the 
Nationalist, because the conservative Commissioner of Education 
defended competition by going back "as he must ... to 'natural law'." 
What was this law but "the survival of the fittest," the Nationalist 
asked, "the acme of individualism, and a colossal selfishness." "But 
this seems [n.b.]," he concluded, "to be Professor Harris's ideal." On 
at least one occasion a defender of modified laissez-faire, goaded by 
35Bellamy, Looking Backward (New York, 1951), 213-27; A. Morgan, Edward 
Bellamy (New York, 1944), 262; Jesse Cox, "Objections to Nationalism," Nationalist, 
III (1889), 325-30. 36Lloyd, Wealth against Commonwealth, 494-95. 
37Martha Avery, "The Curse of Charity," Nationalist, I (1889), 184-87. 
38Lloyd, Notebook I (eye) (1887), 122, Lloyd Papers. 
39Bellamy, Looking Backward, 213-27. 
40Lloyd, Notebook G (1888), 112; XVIII (1890), 475; "Kidd's 'Social Evolution'," 
MSS Additional (1896), 1-3, Lloyd Papers; Wealth against Commonwealth, 494-95. 
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references to the "brutal" laws of nature, offered protest in order to 
counter the reformers' advantage. Thus the economist Francis A. 
Walker in a review of Looking Backward attacked such a reference in 
the Nationalist platform. "There is an old proverb that says, Speak 
well of the bridge that has carried you safely over," he cautioned, lec- 
turing the Bellamyites on the past role of struggle. Walker added that 
he would deem anyone who ignored this debt "utterly lacking in the 
biological sense," and urged more, not less, competition. And, for 
this brief excursion, he became to readers of the Nationalist another 
representative of dominant Darwinian reactionism.41 
Had these charges of conservative Darwinism been confined to 
openly partisan appeals they might well have been dismissed by his- 
torians. But from the start the allegation had support of a more 
weighty sort from many social scientists who were disturbed, as the 
President of the Social Science Association put it, by "our friends of 
the pessimistic school [who] dwell with grim satisfaction on the 
doctrine that teaches the 'survival of the fittest.' "42 Themselves re- 
formers, many of these social scientists shared the general sympathies 
of George, Lloyd, and Bellamy, but added to them professional and 
often somewhat technical methodological concerns that considerably 
complicated their relation with Darwinism, and in particular with 
Herbert Spencer to whom many owed a great debt. No one better il- 
lustrates the effects of such complications than Lester Frank Ward. 
Author of Dynamic Sociology (1883), Ward held a virtual monopoly 
in American sociology in its earliest years and subsequently won the 
plaudits of a younger generation who spread his gospel in the uni- 
versities of the middle west and east during the 1890's and after. Re- 
discovered in the 1930's Ward seemed to a generation of New Deal 
liberals an "American Aristotle" whose "sociocracy" forecast the 
general outline of Roosevelt's program. Few individuals, it also hap- 
pens, were more active in alerting contemporaries to the dangers of 
conservative Darwinism.43 
Ward, alone among the reformers here considered, dealt with the 
4Herbert Birdsall, "Professor Harris's Discovery," Nationalist, II (1890), 61-3. 
Cf. Harris, "Edward Bellamy's Vision," Forum, VIII (1889), 207-8. Francis A. Walker, 
"Mr. Bellamy and the New Nationalist Party," Atlantic Monthly, LXV (1890), 261- 
62. Cobb, "General Walker," op. cit. Harris and Walker in fact illustrate the Hegel- 
ianism and classical economics, respectively, that sustained the conservative position 
during the period. 
42Franklin B. Sanborn, "The Social Sciences," J. Soc. Sci., XXI (1886), 5; J. W. 
Powell, "Competition as a Factor in Human Evolution," American Anthropologist, old 
series I (1888), 297-323; James C. Welling, "The Turning Point of Modern Sociological 
Science," Anthrop. Soc. Washington, Transactions, II (1882), 22-25; J. B. Clark, The 
Philosophy of Wealth (Boston, 1886), 135, 200, 219; E. A. Ross, Foundations of Sociol- 
ogy (New York, 1900), 341-43. 
43Samuel Chugerman, Lester Ward, the American Aristotle (Durham, N.C. 
1939). 
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issue explicitly in terms of the phrase "social Darwinism," although 
not until late in his career.44 However as early as the 1870's he had 
begun, like the others, to fashion an image of a conservative Darwinist 
opposition. A first step came in a detailed definition of "nature" much 
like that which Lloyd and Bellamy accepted less consciously. Nature, 
wrote Ward in an early critique of Spencer, was not the orderly integra- 
tion of matter postulated in the Synthetic Philosophy, but a waste- 
ful push and pull in which massive positive ("integrative") forces 
were necessary merely to hold negative ("disintegrative") forces at 
bay. Ward noted further that this struggle and waste had parallels in 
society. "The wars of men with their surroundings, with wild beasts, 
and with one another, are the strict analogues of those of the lower 
forms." "Even the silent battle for subsistence has its counterpart in 
the competitive struggles of industry." Waste was everywhere: "in 
wanton destruction of forests, slaughter of wild animals, and the pesti- 
lence and filth of urban civilization."45 
During the 1880's Ward gradually came to the further conclusion 
that defenders of the existing order were interpreting "natural law" 
in Darwinian terms. At first he was merely suspicious: of "represen- 
tatives of science" who stood "boldly in the track of current events"; 
or of the social "tenor and tendency" of recent scientific theory. In 
Dynamic Sociology (1883) he voiced some of this suspicion. But de- 
spite his criticism of Spencer in this book he continued to insist that 
the Englishman was one of several pioneers who had "builded better 
than he knew." He thus stopped short of charging him with misuses of 
Darwinian terminology.46 
This honor Ward saved for William Graham Sumner whose So- 
cial Classes (1884) outraged him both as a sociologist and a reformer 
and provided proof of his previous suspicions. Ward's attack had a 
familiar ring. Translating Sumner's Malthusianism into Darwinism, 
Ward charged that Sumner "degraded" human activity "to a complete 
level with those of animals." Refutation followed. "Those who have 
survived simply prove their fitness to survive." The "fact that fitness 
to survive is something wholly distinct from real superiority, is, of 
course, ignored by the author because he is not a biologist, as all so- 
ciologists should be." At the same time, Ward recognized parallels 
between human and animal struggle that Sumner would have denied, 
using such parallels as reasons why Art must replace Nature. In sub- 
sequent articles Ward further suggested that Sumner was not alone in 
4Esp. Ward, "Social Darwinism," Am. J. Soc., XII (1907), 709-10. 
45Ward, "Cosmic and Organic Evolution," (1877), Glimpses, II, 148-63; "The 
Scientific Basis of Positive Political Economy," (1882), ibid., III, 32-35. 
46Ward, "Political-Social Functions," ibid., II, 336-37; "Scientific Basis," ibid., 
III, 47; Dynamic Sociology (2 vols., New York, 1883), I, 7-8; E. L. Youmans ed., 
Herbert Spencer and the Americans (New York, 1883), 79. 
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his errors. The Yale professor was but the most extreme of Spencer's 
"disciples, particularly in America, [who] delight in going even fur- 
ther than their master," he wrote in 1884.47 
Between the mid-1880's and the time when Ward was forced ex- 
plicitly to define "social Darwinism" in 1905, at least one additional 
factor shaped his thought concerning the conservative Darwinist op- 
position. The assault of the so-called neo-Darwinians (led by August 
Weismann) in the early 1890's pushed Ward squarely into the neo- 
Lamarckian camp, and in doing so further identified "Darwinism," 
in his thinking, with animality and generally ignoble activity. In re- 
sponse to Weismann's suggestion that no acquired characteristics 
could be inherited, he proposed what amounted to a convenient divi- 
sion of labor between neo-Darwinians and neo-Lamarckians. Natural 
selection explained man's animal characteristics, up to and including 
the intellect manifested in commercial cunning. Lamarckianism ex- 
plained the higher faculties, the "intense exercise" of which impressed 
them "profoundly upon the plastic brain substance and reaction upon 
the germs of posterity, . . . transmitted [them] to descendents 
through centuries of developing civilization."48 
Not coincidentally, this same division was coupled with fresh al- 
legations that unnamed conservatives were misusing biology. In 
several articles of the early 1890's Ward repeated his earlier censure 
of "nature-worship" by "a certain type of mind . . . strengthened since 
Darwin." Upon examining the "practical applications" of neo-Dar- 
winism he found it "to be strikingly in line with the last described." 
In methodological terms neo-Lamarckianism stressed the importance 
of the "Psychologic Basis of Social Economics." In practical terms it 
produced "biological sociologists" urging "survival of the fittest." 
"Everyone is now familiar with the general nature of animal eco- 
nomics," Ward wrote, "it is the survival of the fittest in the struggle 
for existence."49 George and Lloyd certainly were. And Bellamy, in 
an article describing the "Psychologic Basis of Nationalism" told his 
followers that Ward's argument "will bear study as furnishing the 
best of ammunition for replying to the 'survival of the fittest' argu- 
ment against nationalism."50 
The blend of methodological and political concerns in this charge 
of "animal economics" seemed to Ward only natural. Had not Her- 
bert Spencer in his "Justice" (1891) and in revising and reissuing 
Social Statics with Man vs. The State (1892) hardened his conserva- 
47Ward, "Professor Sumner's Social Classes" (1884), Glimpses, III, 301-5; "Mind 
as a Social Factor," ibid., III, 365; "False Notions of Government" (1887), ibid., IV, 70. 
48Ward, "Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism" (1891), Glimpses, IV, 290-95. 
49Ibid., 291; "Psychologic Basis (1893), ibid., IV, 345-66; "Political Ethics," 
(1894), ibid., V, 38-66; "Plutocracy" (1895), ibid., V, 228-40. Quoted from "Psychologic 
Basis," 350. 50Quoted ibid., IV, 347. 
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tive position? Had he not violated in these tracts crucial distinctions 
upon which he had insisted in his earlier writings, in particular his 
statement that "survival of the fittest" had no role to play in modern 
civilization?51 Moreover, was not this same Spencer under attack by a 
growing number of sociologists who stressed "imitation" and psycho- 
logical factors in social development, an attack that might conve- 
niently, if somewhat imprecisely, be termed a criticism of "biological 
analogies"? Was not this same emphasis on mental factors rein- 
forced by the resurgence of Idealism in philosophy, and in particular 
by Schopenhauer's concept of "will" to which Ward himself was es- 
pecially attracted?52 In sum, if the charge of "animal economics" had 
roots in Ward's social concerns in the 1880's, it was revitalized by 
scientific, sociological, and philosophical currents in the 1890's. 
In 1905 and 1906, Ward learned that others had their own version 
of the same charge-"social Darwinism"-directed not only against 
laissez-faire, but also against certain eugenic arguments, and against 
the view that international struggle and warfare produced progress. 
The irony, and the cause of Ward's concern, lay in the fact that he had 
argued each of these latter positions himself. Since the early 1890's 
he had been mildly interested in "negative" eugenics, as the move- 
ment to improve the race via marriage laws and other precautionary 
measures was termed.53 And he had also emerged in the same period 
as a major American champion of the "struggle" school of sociology, 
led in Europe by Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz.54 Indeed the Russian 
sociologist and peace advocate, Novikov, had singled out Ward and the 
two Europeans as leading exponents of "le Darwinisme sociale."55 
Responding to this turn of events, Ward found himself in a quan- 
dary. He knew that in one sense the charge against some eugenicists 
and some militarists was not unjust: extremists in both camps often 
spiced their appeals with Darwinian slogans.56 How could Ward main- 
5'Ward, "Political Ethics," ibid., V, 38-66. Spencer's Principles of Biology (2 vols., 
New York, 1910), I, 553, affirmed that "social arrangements" nullified the "survival of 
the fittest" in the case of modern man. Progress in recent centuries might thus be 
"ascribed almost wholly" to adaptation on the Lamarckian model. 
52See index references to Schopenhauer in Ward, The Psychic Factors of Civiliza- 
tion (Boston, 1892). 
53See "Neo-Darwinism," Glimpses, IV, 294-95; "Social Darwinism," Am. J. 
Soc., XII (1907), 709-10; "Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics," (1913), Glimpses, 
VI, 382-97. 
54Esp. Ward, "Contemporary Sociology," American Journal Sociology, VII 
(Jan.-May, 1902); Pure Sociology (2nd ed., New York, 1907), 193-220; "Evolution of 
Social Structures," American Journal Sociology, X (Mar. 1905), 589-605; "Social and 
Biological Struggles," ibid., XIII (Nov. 1907), 289-99; "Motives in Social Conflict," 
ibid. (Feb. 1908), 646; "Social Integration Through Conflict," ibid. (May 1908), 806-7. 
55J. Novikov, La Justice et l'Expansion de la Vie (Paris, 1905), discussed in Ward, 
Glimpses, VI, 269-71; Novikov, Les Luttes entreSocietes Humaines (Paris, 1893). 
56Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, chs. 8, 9. 
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tain his positions-which called for neither "positive" steps like 
sterilization, on the one hand, nor for militarist-imperialism, on the 
other-and at the same time escape the social Darwinist charge? How 
in domestic affairs could he urge a "sociocracy" (that would accept 
permanent struggle but channel and transform the cosmic conflict), 
against socialist Utopias that would suspend conflict altogether, or a 
laissez-faire jungle in which brute law was totally accepted? 
Attacking these problems, Ward decided that the term "social 
Darwinism" must be eliminated. The tactic of Novikov and the others 
infuriated him. "The sociologists . . . confound the so-called 'struggle 
for existence' with Darwinism, and very few of them have any adequate 
idea of what Darwin's phrase 'natural selection' means," he wrote. 
"With this vague notion in their minds certain of them have invented 
the phrase 'social Darwinism,' and have set it up as a sort of 'man of 
straw' in order to show their agility in knocking it down." He pro- 
tested "in the strongest possible terms against the application of the 
term Darwinism to the race struggle." Malthusianism was also 
wrongly called Darwinism since "it falls far short of embodying even 
the principle of natural selection." When he heard eugenics also being 
called "social Darwinism," Ward simply ducked the question of its 
appropriateness and got down to criticism of the elitist views which it 
masked in the particular case.57 
But what of his own charges against "animal economics"? Had 
Ward too not created a straw man? Did recent allegations of "social 
Darwinism" merely state explicitly what he and others had been doing 
for some time"? Ward answered in effect that the difference lay in the 
fact that he understood Darwin, and others did not. He insisted that 
his suspicions were valid: classical economists were misusing Darwin- 
ian phrases to buttress their position. Ward illustrated this misuse by 
citing a paraphrase of the laissez-faire argument by the Italian sociol- 
ogist, Achilles Loria, also a critic of the classical position. ("Men . . . 
they say, have carried on a terrible struggle for life.... It is therefore 
wrong to deplore the bloody battles between men and the fierce com- 
petition which makes them trample upon one another.") "He does not 
say who defended this doctrine," Ward continued, "but it cannot be 
denied that something near akin to it is held by many biologists ... and 
that it is practically the attitude of most scientific men and evolutionists 
in so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject." Like Loria, 
Ward simply denied their claim to such rhetoric. He had "never yet 
seen any distinctly Darwinian principle appealed to in the discussions 
of 'social Darwinism'." He then went on to explain, as he had so often 
before, how his own teachings harmonized with Darwin's.58 
57Ward, "Social and Biological Struggles," 290-93; "Social Darwinism." 
58Ward, "Social and Biological Struggles," 291-92. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 11 Jun 2015 14:46:22 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
396 ROBERT C. BANNISTER 
Ward's "something near akin" and "practically the attitude," like 
similar qualifiers in the writings of the others considered, strongly 
suggests that he too was fashioning from his own concerns a portrait 
of the opposition that had as little objectivity as the cries of "atheistic 
communism" raised at a later time on the other side. Yet the role 
played by the idea of "social Darwinism" (and equivalent charges) 
would be merely interesting if it did not have further significance in 
both the thought of the period, and in its subsequent historiography. 
The popularity of the charge among reformers suggests that 
certain specifically Darwinian slogans remained highly charged, and 
could be absorbed by conservatives only at their peril. Classical eco- 
nomics, Lockean liberalism, a Franklinesque success mythology: each 
could be bent, quite without Darwin, to serve the needs of the emerg- 
ing capitalist order-by abridging Wealth of Nations to omit Adam 
Smith's concern for the public good, by debasing the "liberty" of the 
Declaration to an uncompromising defense of property, or by forget- 
ting everything Franklin said about character.59 Alternately, a new 
Germanic invasion of neo-Kantian and Hegelian philosophy fostered 
an Idealism which served similar conservative purposes, and was es- 
pecially attractive to those who disliked "materialism."60 All con- 
tained a significant leaven of Christian sentiment, and in one way or 
another posited "natural laws" that would lead to ultimate harmony. 
Evolutionism and organic analogies also contributed to the con- 
servative defense, without violating Enlightenment or Idealist fun- 
damentals, by suggesting that change comes slowly, that society is a 
complex organism, and that "nature" provided reliable guidelines.61 
But Darwinism-with its slogans of "struggle for existence," "natural 
selection," and "survival of the fittest"-was a different matter. Sug- 
gesting (whatever Darwin's intention) that nature's plan was no plan at 
all, Darwinian "nature" presented society a mirror, not of its possibil- 
ities, but of its failures. Dedicated to "natural law," defenders of 
laissez-faire-even those who appealed generally to "evolution"- 
took little comfort from this development. The few who did not ignore 
Darwin, but attempted to incorporate the new terminology, 
opened themselves immediately to a barrage of criticism. Of these 
few Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner were the leading 
examples, and for this reason figured so often in reform indictments. 
Yet far from shaping a new consensus, both Spencer and Sumner saw 
59The specific references are to Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism 
(Cambridge, Mass), chs. 4-5; and Louis B. Wright, "Franklin's Legacy to the 
Gilded Age," Va. Q. R., XXII (Mar. 1946), 268-79. Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of 
American Democratic Thought (New York, 1940), largely ignores social Darwinism 
and stresses the Enlightment and Idealist defenses of property. 
60Perry Miller, "Introduction," American Thought Since the Civil War (New 
York, 1954). 6"Youmans, Sumner, and many others argued in such fashion. 
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their efforts end in futility and failure. Spencer coined "survival of the 
fittest" in the mid-1860's precisely to avoid the anti-uniformitarian and 
anti-progressive connotations of "natural selection"-and then de- 
voted years to agonizing over whether this law did or did not operate 
within civilized society, a debate which in his declining years sapped 
his energies and reduced his audience. William Graham Sumner like- 
wise discovered that "survival of the fittest" was a loaded and danger- 
ous phrase, while even the Malthusian "struggle for existence" of man 
against nature was translated by critics into a Darwinian law of per- 
petual social struggle and hence discredited.62 
The paucity of bona fide examples of conservative Darwinism- 
both in the Gilded Age reform literature here considered, and in later 
histories-was not due simply to the ignorance of conservatives to 
whom the new ideas had not yet filtered down. Rather their silence, 
and the tentativeness of the few who attempted to incorporate Darwin- 
ian slogans, reflected the not remarkable fact that individuals who 
desire stability, consensus, homogeneity, and peaceful change under 
a capitalist regime-as did businessmen and many of their middle 
class defenders-found little comfort in a cosmology that posited per- 
manent struggle as the engine of progress. When non-Marxist re- 
formers like Lloyd, Bellamy, and Ward accepted such a vision, they 
too were anxious to temper its revolutionary aspects. Struggle, all 
agreed, was a fact of life, but would henceforth be among "minds" 
and "consciences." In Lloyd's version: "There is a struggle for sur- 
vival among consciences . . . and survival of the fittest." In the Bel- 
lamyite: "a mental and moral competition ... in which the law of the 
survival of the fittest will have full and unrestrained sway."63 
But the reformers also wished to distinguish their neo-liberalism 
from the older creed which it challenged. While their spiritual zeal 
became the hallmark of progressivism, the same reformers attacked 
traditional liberalism by charging that its tenets of individualism, 
free enterprise, competition, and laissez-faire were merely bogus 
biology. Darwinism, far from buttressing these older virtues, thus 
sounded their death knell in a double sense: first in providing an emo- 
tionally charged rhetoric to describe the existing order; and second 
by the restoration of the older values in a form that discredited their 
proponents. 
The sincerity and persistence of the stereotype of conservative 
62E. g., "The Selfish Sciences," New York Times, March 9, 1883; C. F. Adams, 
[letter], ibid., March 18, 1883; "Cornering a Professor," n.p., n.d., (all clippings in 
Folio 206, pp. 44-6, Sumner Papers, Yale); A. Jaretski, Index, n.s. VI (Dec. 17, 1885), 
294-96; Ward "Mind as a Social Factor," Glimpses, III, 365. 
63Lloyd, Notebook [Diary] XXXIX (Nov. 15, 1886); I (ca. 1887), 17, Lloyd 
Papers; John S. Cobb, "General Walker and the Atlantic," Nationalist, II (1890), 
135-38. 
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"Social Darwinism" suggest that its recurrence in reform literature 
was no cynical tactic. Industrial America seemed a jungle in which 
human purpose and effort played increasingly less role. Some "rugged" 
individuals appeared to defend the situation in the name of "science," 
and therefore the "science" in question must be the jungle law of Dar- 
winism. Such logic supposedly made a special appeal to a generation 
whose warm embrace of "science" masked a covert fear of its 
"logical" implications. So viewed, the conservative "Social Darwin- 
ism" stereotype represented an anti-utopian blueprint of a world 
guided solely by "scientific" considerations, thus providing a recur- 
ring motif in the Anglo-American reaction against "scientism."64 
The widespread acceptance of "conservative Darwinism" in the 
histories of the 1940's and 1950's65 was a final chapter in this same 
story. A number of other factors had etched the portrait more deeply 
in the intervening decades. Chief among these were (1) a popular iden- 
tification of Nietzscheanism with Darwinism and militarism before 
and during World War I, an association that produced charges not 
only of Darwinian militarism but of "individualism" (Nietzsche) and 
"elitism" (Junkerdom); (2) the appeal to Darwinism by eugenicists, 
a movement that made many reformers uneasy, even when it was in- 
fused with the humanitarianism of the progressive period, and that be- 
came a national concern when Hitler proposed mass extermination of 
the "unfit"; and (3) New Deal debates in which laissez-faire individ- 
ualism revived, perhaps now bolstered by a genuine conservative Dar- 
winian folk-wisdom such as expressed by one "Middletown" business- 
man who affirmed "the strongest and best survive-that's the law of 
nature after all."66 The fact that George, Ward, and Bellamy seemed 
prophets of the New Deal added lustre to their charges. The mid- 
century historians then found additional evidence in much the same 
way the reformers had: by labelling "Darwinistic" all references to 
"natural law," "evolution," and even "development,"; and by mis- 
construing complex methodological debates concerning the value of 
"biological analogies."67 The result in the case of "conservative 
Darwinism" was distortion and exaggeration that is perhaps better 
termed-to borrow from Lester Ward-a "man of straw" set up to be 
knocked down. However wrongheaded, Gilded Age conservatives 
should be allowed to state their case in their own words. 
Swarthmore College. 
64For an explicit manipulation of "conservative Darwinism" in connection with 
an extended anti-Utopian vision see Ignatius Donnelly, Caesar's Column (John Har- 
vard edn., 1960), 177 ff. 65See note 2. 
"6An important World War I statement of the Nietzsche-Darwin-Junker con- 
nection is George Nasmyth, Social Progress and Darwinian Theory (New York, 1916), 
an explication of the views of J. Novikov. The Middletown statement is quoted in 
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 50. 67Esp. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, ch. 8. 
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